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      etween 1952 and 1960, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) embarked on a project to write a detailed commentary on each of 
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, based primarily on the negotiating his-
tory of the Conventions and prior State practice. With the passage of time, 
the ICRC decided to update the commentaries to reflect State practice “in 
applying and interpreting the Conventions . . . during the decades since their 
adoption.”1 By doing so, the ICRC would “ensure that the new editions re-
flect contemporary practice and legal interpretation.”2 
The maritime landscape, both operationally and legally, has changed sig-
nificantly since the first edition of the Commentary on the Second Geneva 
Convention (GCII) was published in 1960.3 ICRC experts believe that the 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked can be better protected if the GCII rules 
are clearly understood in light of current operational realities. Accordingly, 
the intent of the updated Commentary is to reflect current State practice and 
provide “up-to-date legal interpretations based on the latest practice, case 
law, academic commentary and ICRC experience” to afford greater protec-
tion for combatants and civilians during armed conflicts at sea.4 
One question left unanswered by the new Commentary is the relationship 
between international humanitarian law (IHL) and other international trea-
ties applicable to the maritime domain, such as the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and treaties adopted under 
the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Does the 
outbreak of hostilities terminate or suspend the applicability of these mari-
time conventions or do they remain in effect, in part or in their entirety, 
                                                                                                                      
1. Introduction to INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY 
ON THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (II) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF 
THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED 
FORCES AT SEA ¶ 5 (2017) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND GENEVA CON-
VENTION]. 
The ICRC published its Commentary on the First Geneva Convention in 2016. See 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GE-
NEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF 
THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (2016). 
2. Introduction to COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION ¶ 5. 
3. See Peter Maurer, Foreword to COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND GENEVA CONVEN-
TION, supra note 1. 












during an armed conflict at sea? Do different rules apply between parties to 
the conflict and parties to the conflict and neutral powers? Are parties to the 
conflict and neutral powers nevertheless bound during an armed conflict at 
sea by the provisions of the maritime conventions that reflect customary in-
ternational law? This article analyzes these questions in light of the 1969 Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Law Commis-
sion’s 2011 Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, 
and U.S. State practice, focusing primarily on the duty to render assistance 
to mariners in distress at sea. 
 
II. SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION 
 
GCII establishes a legal framework for the humane treatment and protection 
of victims of armed conflict at sea. In this regard, Article 12 requires parties 
to the conflict to respect and protect, in all circumstances, members of the 
armed forces and other individuals falling with the scope of the Convention 
“who are at sea and who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked . . . without any 
adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opin-
ions, or any other similar criteria.”5 Paramount to achieving this core objec-
tive of humane treatment, the parties to the conflict are required, after each 
engagement and without delay, to “take all possible measures to search for 
and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick,” without discriminating be-
tween their own and enemy personnel.6 This obligation has its origins in Ar-
ticle 16(1) of the Tenth 1907 Hague Convention, which provides that “after 
every engagement, the two belligerents, so far as military interests permit, 
shall take steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick, and wounded, and to pro-
tect them . . . against pillage and ill-treatment.”7 The main difference between 
the 1907 and 1949 conventions is that the phrase “so far as military interests 
permit” was replaced with “take all possible measures,” thus applying the 
stricter requirement adopted for war on land to war at sea. 
                                                                                                                      
5. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85 [hereinafter GC II]. Individuals failing within the scope of the Convention are set forth 
in Article 13. 
6. Id. art. 18; see also COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION, supra 
note 1, art. 18, ¶ 1618. 
7. Convention No. X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the 
Geneva Convention art. 16, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, T.S. No. 543, reprinted in THE LAWS 
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 397 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 












There may be circumstances, however, in which the belligerents do not 
have the capability or capacity to conduct adequate search and rescue oper-
ations after an engagement. In such cases, the 1949 Convention allows the 
parties to the conflict to facilitate and supplement their search and recovery 
efforts by appealing “to the charity of commanders of neutral merchant ves-
sels, yachts or other craft, to take on board and care for wounded, sick or 
shipwrecked persons, and to collect the dead.”8 A similar provision is found 
in Article 17(2) of Additional Protocol I, which provides “the Parties to the 
conflict may appeal to the civilian population and the aid societies . . . to 
collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and to search for 
the dead and report their location.”9 This obligation was first included in 
Article 9 of the Tenth Hague Convention: “Belligerents may appeal to the 
charity of the commanders of neutral merchant ships, yachts, or boats to 
take on board and tend the sick and wounded.”10 
Article 21, Article 9’s counterpart in the 1949 Convention, clearly does 
not impose an obligation on the parties to the conflict to request assistance, 
stating, “the Parties . . . may appeal.”11 Nonetheless, the 2017 Commentary 
takes the position that appealing to the charity of neutrals to provide assis-
tance is not necessarily a discretionary function. In circumstances where it is 
not feasible for a belligerent warship engaged in a surface action to conduct 
a search and rescue operation, the ICRC believes that the parties to the con-
flict may be legally bound to notify nearby neutral coastal authorities, hu-
manitarian organizations, or “vessels in the vicinity that there are ship-
wrecked, wounded, sick or dead in need of rescue or recovery, and appeal to 
their charity to take them on board and care for them.”12 The ICRC’s posi-
tion that this is not a discretionary function is understandable given the over-
arching obligation of the parties to the conflict in Article 18 to promptly 
collect and “ensure” the adequate care of the shipwrecked, wounded, and 
                                                                                                                      
8. Neutral vessels that respond to such an appeal or that have on their own accord 
provided assistance to wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons, “shall enjoy special protec-
tion and facilities to carry out such assistance.” GC II, supra note 5, art. 21. 
9. The belligerents “shall grant both protection and the necessary facilities to those who 
respond to this appeal.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 17, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
10. Hague Convention No. X, supra note 7, art. 9. 
11. GC II, supra note 5, art. 21 (emphasis added). 













sick, as well as in the general purpose and intent of GCII to maximize pro-
tection for victims of armed conflict at sea. Nonetheless, the plain language 
of the Convention—“may appeal”—does not support this conclusion. 
Similarly, it does not appear that GCII obliges a neutral to respond to 
the request for assistance given the language of Article 21, under which ap-
peals are made to the “charity” of commanders of neutral vessels. However, 
the Commentary correctly states that this does not mean “that the response to 
an appeal . . . is necessarily left entirely to the commander’s discretion.”13 As 
discussed in the following Part, there are a number of non-IHL treaties that 
impose an obligation on States to come to the assistance of persons in danger 
of being lost at sea. To the extent these treaties have not been annulled by 
the concept of lex specialis and remain in effect during an armed conflict at 
sea, neutrals would arguably have a duty to provide the requested assistance, 
if feasible and consistent with their treaty obligations. 
 
III. DUTY TO RENDER ASSISTANCE 
 
Customary international law has long recognized the affirmative obligation 
of mariners to render assistance to persons in distress at sea to the extent 
they can do so without serious danger to their ship, crew, or passengers. This 
long-standing custom is codified in a number of international treaties 
adopted under the auspices of the IMO, as well as the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas14 and the 1982 UNCLOS.15 Moreover, there is 
nothing in IHL that precludes neutrals from providing such assistance. On 
the contrary, Article 17(1) of Additional Protocol I specifically provides that 
the “civilian population and aid societies . . . shall be permitted, even on their 
own initiative, to collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, 
even in invaded or occupied areas.”16 Moreover, “no one shall be harmed, 
prosecuted, convicted or punished for such humanitarian acts,”17 which 
would suggest that the customary duty to render assistance remains in force 
during an armed conflict. 
 
                                                                                                                      
13. Id. art. 21, ¶ 1872. 
14. Convention on the High Seas art. 12, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 
5639, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. 
15. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 













A. International Maritime Organization Treaties 
 
The duty to render assistance first appeared in the 1910 Salvage Conven-
tion,18 almost forty years before the IMO was formally established.19 The 
obligation is codified in Article 11, which provides that “every master is 
bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel, her crew 
and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even though an enemy, 
found at sea in danger of being lost.”20 The Convention explicitly does not 
apply to warships or other “Government ships appropriated exclusively to a 
public service.”21 However, given that the obligation extends to anyone in 
distress, “even though an enemy,” the duty to render assistance under the 
Salvage Convention applies both in times of peace and during an armed con-
flict. 
An obligation to render assistance, as well as establish search and rescue 
services, is also contained in the International Convention of the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS).22 Regulation V/7 requires States to “undertake to en-
sure that necessary arrangements are made for distress communication and 
co-ordination in their area of responsibility and for the rescue of persons in 
distress at sea around its coasts.”23 Regulation V/33 further requires that 
masters of ships at sea—which are in a position to be able to provide assis-
tance—on receiving a signal from any source that persons are in distress at 
sea, “proceed with all speed to their assistance.”24 If the ship receiving the 
request is unable or considers it unreasonable or unnecessary to provide as-
sistance, “the master must enter in the log-book the reason for failing to 
                                                                                                                      
18. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Respecting Assistance and 
Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, T.S. No. 576 [hereinafter 1910 Salvage Con-
vention]. 
19. The IMO was not established until 1948. Convention on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 
U.N.T.S. 3. The organization’s name was later simplified to the International Maritime Or-
ganization as it is now known. 
20. 1910 Salvage Convention, supra note 18, art. 11. 
21. Id. art. 14. 
22. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 
1184 U.N.T.S. 2. 
23. “These arrangements shall include the establishment, operation and maintenance 
of such search and rescue facilities as are deemed practicable and necessary, having regard 
to the density of the seagoing traffic and the navigational dangers and shall, so far as possi-
ble, provide adequate means of locating and rescuing such persons.” Id. annex, ch. V, reg. 
7. 












proceed to the assistance of the persons in distress . . . [and] inform the 
appropriate search and rescue service accordingly.”25 Regulation V/33 addi-
tionally authorizes the relevant search and rescue service to 
 
requisition . . . ships as the . . . search and rescue service considers best able 
to render assistance, and it shall be the duty of the master or masters of the 
ship or ships requisitioned to comply with the requisition by continuing to 
proceed with all speed to the assistance of persons in distress.26 
 
Like the 1910 Salvage Convention, SOLAS Regulation V/1 also exempts 
warships, naval auxiliaries, and other ships owner or operated by a State and 
used only on government non-commercial service from its application. 
Nonetheless, warships and other government vessels “are encouraged to act 
in a manner consistent, so far as reasonable and practicable, with . . . chapter 
[V].”27 As discussed in Part VI below, U.S. State practice is to apply the duty 
to render assistance to its warships and other non-commercial government-
owned or operated vessels.28 
The 1979 Search and Rescue Convention29 contains similar provisions 
regarding the establishment of search and rescue services and the duty to 
render assistance to persons in distress at sea. Chapter 2 of the Convention’s 
annex requires the parties to make the “necessary arrangements . . . for the 
provision of adequate search and rescue services for persons in distress at 
sea round their coasts.”30 If a party receives information that a person is in 
distress at sea in its search and rescue region, “the responsible authorities . . 
. shall take urgent steps to provide the most appropriate assistance availa-
ble.”31 Additionally, any unit that receives information of a distress incident 
shall take “immediate action to assist as is within its capability or shall alert 
other units which might be able to assist, and shall notify the rescue co-or-
dination centre or rescue sub-centre in whose area the incident has oc-
curred.”32 
                                                                                                                      
25. Id. 
26. Id. ¶ 2. 
27 Id. annex, ch. V, reg. 1, ¶ 1. 
28. See supra Part VI. 
29. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, T.I.A.S 
No. 11,093, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97. 
30. Id. annex, ch. 2, ¶ 2.1.1. 
31. Id. ¶ 2.1.9. 












Chapter 3 of the annex further requires the parties to coordinate their 
search and rescue operations with neighboring States,33 and encourages par-
ties to allow their rescue coordination centers to provide assistance, when 
requested, “to other rescue coordination centers, including assistance in the 
form of vessels, aircraft, personnel or equipment.”34 Moreover, assistance 
shall be provided “regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or 
the circumstances in which that person is found,” which suggests that the 
obligation applies in times of peace, as well as during an armed conflict at 
sea.35 This conclusion is further supported by Article II of the Convention, 
which provides that “no provision of the Convention shall be construed as 
prejudicing obligations or rights of vessels provided for in other international 
instruments.”36 
Finally, Article 10 of the 1989 Salvage Convention imposes a duty on 
every master, “so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel and 
persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost 
at sea.”37 The Convention further requires the parties to cooperate in matters 
related to salvage “in order to ensure efficient and successful performance 
of salvage operations for the purpose of saving life or property in danger.”38 
Like the 1910 Salvage Convention, the requirements of the 1989 Convention 
do “not apply to warships or other non-commercial vessels owned or oper-
ated by a State and entitled . . . to sovereign immunity under generally rec-
ognized principles of international law unless that State decides otherwise,” 
in which case the party shall notify the Secretary-General, specifying the 
terms and conditions of such application to its sovereign immune vessels.39 
State parties are additionally required to adopt measures necessary to enforce 
the duty to render assistance.40 
 
B. Other International Agreements 
 
Apart from the aforementioned IMO instruments, the 1958 High Seas Con-
vention, UNCLOS, and the 1944 Chicago Convention also impose a duty to 
                                                                                                                      
33. Id. annex, ch. 3, ¶ 3.1.1. 
34. Id. ¶ 3.1.7. 
35. Id. annex, ch. 2, ¶ 2.1.10. 
36. Id. art. II(2). 
37. International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, 1953 U.N.T.S. 165. 
38. Id. art. 11. 
39. Id. art. 4. 












render assistance to persons in distress at sea. Article 12 of the High Seas 
Convention provides: 
 
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship sailing under its flag, insofar 
as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passen-
gers: 
(a) To render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; 
(b) To proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress 
if informed of their need of assistance, insofar as such action may reason-
ably be expected of him.41 
 
The duty is not, however, absolute. The master is only required to act when 
doing so would not place the ship or its crew and passengers in “serious 
danger.”42 Article 12 further requires coastal States to “promote the estab-
lishment and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue 
service regarding safety on and over the sea and—where circumstances so 
require—by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbour-
ing States for this purpose.”43 
A nearly identical requirement, with the same limiting language, is found 
in Article 98 of UNCLOS: 
 
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as 
he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; 
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, 
if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reason-
ably be expected of him . . . . 
 
2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and 
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regard-
ing safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way 
of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbouring States for 
this purpose.44 
 
UNCLOS additionally makes clear that nothing in the Convention is in-
tended to “alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from 
                                                                                                                      
41. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 14, art. 12. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 












other agreements compatible with . . . [UNCLOS] and which do not affect 
the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of 
their obligations under . . . [UNCLOS].”45 Arguably, the duty to search for 
casualties after an engagement imposed by Article 18 of GCII is consistent 
with the duty to render assistance under Article 98. 
States parties to the Chicago Convention46 are similarly required to de-
vote aviation assets to provide prompt search and rescue services. If a pilot-
in-command observes 
 
another aircraft or a surface craft . . . in distress, the pilot shall, if possible 
and unless considered unreasonable or unnecessary . . . keep the craft in 
distress in sight until compelled to leave the scene or advised by the rescue 
coordination centre that it is no longer necessary. . . .47 
 
Moreover, upon receipt of information concerning an emergency, rescue co-
ordination centers shall “evaluate such information and assess the extent of 
the operation required.”48 The obligation to conduct search and rescue op-
erations continues “when practicable, until all survivors are delivered to a 
place of safety or until all reasonable hope of rescuing survivors has 
passed.”49 
Like the IMO instruments, Annex 12 to the Convention also requires 
contracting States to “individually or in cooperation with other States, ar-
range for the establishment and prompt provision of search and rescue ser-
vices within their territories to ensure that assistance is rendered to persons 
in distress.”50 This assistance shall be provided to aircraft in distress and to 
survivors of aircraft accidents “regardless of the nationality or status of such 
persons or the circumstances in which such persons are found,”51 which 
again suggests that the obligations of the Chicago Convention remain in 
force during an armed conflict. 
 
                                                                                                                      
45. Id. art. 311. 
46. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
47. International Civil Aviation Organization, Search and Rescue, Annex 12 to the Con-
vention on Civil Aviation ch. 5, ¶ 5.6.2.a (2004). 
48. Id. ¶ 5.1.2. 
49. Id. ¶ 5.5.1. 
50. Id. ch. 2, ¶ 2.1.1. 












IV. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
 
Rules of treaty interpretation are set out in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT).52 Article 31 provides the general rule: “a treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.”53 A treaty may only be terminated or suspended “as a result 
of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the . . . [VCLT].”54 Of 
note, none of the treaties imposing the duty to render assistance contains an 
express provision providing for their suspension or termination during an 
armed conflict. 
If the provisions of the treaty are unclear or its interpretation “leads to a 
result that is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable,” then “recourse may be 
had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to con-
firm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31. . . .”55 Given 
the humanitarian nature of the duty to render assistance contained in the 
various maritime conventions, which is akin to the obligation to search for 
casualties imposed by Article 18 of GCII, an interpretation that these con-
ventions automatically terminate or are suspended at the outbreak of an 
armed conflict would appear to be “manifestly absurd and unreasonable.” 
The VCLT also cautions that 
 
the invalidity [or] termination . . . of a treaty . . . or the suspension of its 
operation . . . shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfill any 
obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under inter-
national law independently of the treaty.56 
 
Here, the most obvious example is customary international law obligations. 
Most States and legal scholars would agree that the duty to render assistance 
is a long-standing customary international law norm. 
 
                                                                                                                      
52. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [here-
inafter VCLT]. 
53. Id. art. 31(1). 
54. Id. art. 42(2). 
55. Id. art. 32. 
56. Id. art. 43. Furthermore, Article 73 states the provisions of the VCLT do “not pre-
judge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from . . . the international responsi-












V. DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE EFFECTS OF ARMED CONFLICT ON 
TREATIES 
 
As stated in Article 73, one issue left unanswered by the VCLT is the effect 
of armed conflict on State obligations under existing treaties. Consequently, 
in 2000 the International Law Commission (ILC) identified this gap as a 
topic for its long-term work program. Between 2005 and 2008, the ILC dis-
cussed the issue and in 2008 adopted on first reading a set of eighteen draft 
articles and an annex, along with commentaries. These draft articles and an-
nex were submitted to governments for comment and observations through 
the U.N. Secretary-General. In 2010, the special rapporteur submitted his 
proposed amendments to the draft articles to the ILC, taking into account 
the comments and observations of governments. The following year, after 
discussing the special rapporteur’s report, the ILC adopted the draft articles 
and annex, with commentaries, and transmitted them to the U.N. General 
Assembly with a recommendation to take note of the draft and to consider 
the possibility of concluding a treaty on the subject at a later date. The Gen-
eral Assembly accepted the ILC’s recommendation in Resolution 66/99 on 
December 9, 2011,57 and subsequently decided to return to the issue in 2017 
with a view to examining the form to be given to the draft articles and invit-
ing governments to comment on any future action regarding them.58 
Consistent with paragraph 48 of the GCII Commentary, Article 3 of the 
draft ILC articles reflects the contemporary international law principle that 
“the existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend 
the operation of treaties as between (a) States parties to the conflict [or] (b) 
a State party to the conflict and a State that is not.”59 An armed conflict may, 
therefore, affect the obligations of parties to a preexisting treaty in different 
ways, depending on whether they are a belligerent or a neutral. Article 3 “es-
tablishes the general principle of legal stability and continuity,”60 reflected in 
the 1985 resolution of the Institute of International Law (IIL) on the Effects 
                                                                                                                      
57. G.A. Res. 66/99, Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties (Dec. 9, 2012). 
58. G.A. Res. 69/125, Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties (Dec. 10, 2014). 
59. Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, in Report of the International Law Commission 
to the General Assembly, 66 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 173, art.3, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 
(2011), reprinted in [2011] 2 Y.B. Int’l. Comm’n (forthcoming) [hereinafter Draft ILC Arti-
cles]. 












of Armed Conflict on Treaties,61 as well as contemporary domestic case 
law.62 
Article 2 of the 1985 IIL resolution provides that “the outbreak of an 
armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of trea-
ties in force between the parties to the armed conflict.”63 The same principle 
applies to neutrals pursuant to Article 5—“the outbreak of an armed conflict 
does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of bilateral treaties in 
force between a party to that conflict and third States.”64 Similarly, “the out-
break of an armed conflict between some of the parties to a multilateral 
treaty does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of that treaty 
between other contracting States or between them and the States parties to 
the armed conflict.”65 Articles 3 and 4 further clarify that “the outbreak of 
an armed conflict renders operative, in accordance with their own provi-
sions, between the parties treaties . . . which by reason of their nature or 
purpose are to be regarded as operative during an armed conflict,”66 and that 
“the existence of an armed conflict does not entitle a party unilaterally to 
terminate or to suspend the operation of treaty provisions relating to the 
protection of the human person, unless treaty otherwise provides.”67 None 
of the aforementioned treaties that impose the humanitarian obligation to 
render assistance to persons in distress at sea contains a provision that would 
allow for their termination or suspension in the event of an armed conflict. 
Articles 4 through 7 of the draft ILC articles provide guidance to assist 
in the analysis of whether a treaty remains in effect (partially or entirely) dur-
ing an armed conflict. The first question is whether the treaty contains a 
provision “on its operation in situations of armed conflict,” if so, those pro-
visions apply.68 As previously indicated, none of the relevant conventions 
contains such a provision. 
Absent an express provision, the next step is to apply the rules of treaty 
interpretation contained in the VCLT.69 As discussed in Part IV, none of the 
treaties imposing the duty to render assistance contains an express provision 
                                                                                                                      
61. Institute of International Law, The Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties (1985), 
http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1985_hel_03_en.pdf. 
62. See Part VI. 
63. Institute of International Law, supra note 61, at art. 3 
64. Id. art 5. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. art. 3. 
67. Id. art. 4. 
68. Draft ILC Articles, supra note 59, art. 4. 












providing for their suspension or termination during an armed conflict. 
Moreover, any interpretation of these treaties that would suspend or termi-
nate their application completely during an armed conflict would arguably 
be “manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”70 Furthermore, a convincing argu-
ment can be made that the duty to render assistance is a customary norm of 
international law and, as provided in Article 43 of the VCLT, termination or 
suspension of a treaty does not abrogate the duty of States parties to fulfill 
their obligations embodied in the treaty to which they would be subject un-
der international law independently of the treaty.71 Applying these general 
rules of treaty interpretation to the maritime conventions, it could be argued 
that they remain in force, at least, with respect to nations that are not parties 
to the armed conflict. 
Nonetheless, if the VLCT’s rules of interpretation are not determinative, 
Article 6 of the draft ILC articles provides additional factors that can help 
decide whether a treaty terminates or is suspended in the event of an armed 
conflict. These factors include: 
 
(a) the nature of the treaty, its particular subject matter, its object and pur-
pose, its content and the number of parties to treaty; and 
 
(b) the characteristics of the armed conflict, such as its territorial extent, its 
scale and intensity, its duration and, in the case of non-international armed 
conflict, also the degree of outside involvement.72 
 
There is widespread international adherence to all of the maritime trea-
ties. The 1910 Salvage Convention has eighty States Parties,73 while the 1989 
Salvage Conventions has seventy States parties.74 SOLAS and UNCLOS 
have 16375 and 16876 parties, respectively. Similarly, the Search and Rescue 
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Convention has 111 States parties.77 The object and purpose of these treaties, 
particularly the humanitarian duty to render assistance, is consistent with the 
humanitarian object and purpose of GCII to limit the suffering of victims of 
armed conflict at sea. These factors clearly weigh in favor of concluding that 
the treaties remain in force, at least in part, during an armed conflict. 
Finally, the annex to the draft ILC articles provides a list of treaties that, 
based on their subject matter, exhibit a higher likelihood of continued ap-
plicability following the outbreak of an armed conflict.78 One category that 
meets this criterion and therefore remains in effect during an armed conflict, 
whether all or only some of the contracting parties are belligerents, is multi-
lateral law-making treaties.79 Such treaties are defined as treaties that “create 
rules of international law for regulating the future conduct of the parties 
without creating an international regime, status, or system.”80 A 1948 letter 
from the Legal Advisor to the State Department sets out the U.S. position 
regarding such treaties: 
 
[N]on-political multilateral treaties to which the US was a party when the 
US became a belligerent in the war, and which . . . [the United States] has 
not since denounced in accordance with the terms thereof, are still in force 
in respect of the US and that the existence of a state of war between some 
of the parties to such treaties did not ipso facto abrogate them, although it is 
realized that, as a practical matter, certain of the provisions might have 
been inoperative. The view of this Government is that the effect of the war 
on such treaties was only to terminate or suspend their execution as be-
tween opposing belligerents, and that, in the absence of special reasons for 
a contrary view, they remained in force between co-belligerents, between 
belligerents and neutral parties, and between neutral parties.81 
 
A similar position was expressed in the 1948 letter of an official of the British 
Foreign Office: 
 
It is not the view of His Majesty’s Government that multilateral conven-
tions ipso facto should lapse with the outbreak of war, and this is particularly 
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true in the case of conventions to which neutral Powers are parties. . . . 
Indeed, the true legal doctrine would appear to be that it is only the sus-
pension of normal peaceful relations between belligerents which renders 
impossible the fulfillment of multilateral conventions insofar as concerns 
them, and operates as a temporary suspension as between the belligerents 
of such conventions. . . . As regards multilateral conventions to which only 
the belligerents are parties, if these are of a non-political and technical na-
ture, the view upon which His Majesty’s Government would probably act 
is that they would be suspended during the war, but would thereafter revive 
automatically unless specifically terminated.82 
 
All of the maritime conventions that impose an obligation to render assis-
tance to persons in distress at sea would appear to fall within the category of 
multilateral law-making treaties. 
Moreover, consistent with Article 43 of the VCLT, Article 10 of the draft 
ILC articles provides that termination or suspension of a treaty as a result of 
an armed conflict “shall not impair in any way the duty of any State to fulfill 
any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under 
international law independently of that treaty.”83 This principle is consistent 
with the International Court of Justice opinion in the Nicaragua case: “The 
fact that the above-mentioned principles [of general and customary interna-
tional law], recognized as such, have been codified or embodied in multilat-
eral conventions does not mean that they cease to exist and to apply as prin-
ciples of customary law, even as regards countries that are parties to such 
conventions.”84 The duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea is 
widely recognized as a customary norm of international law. This duty re-
mains in force during an armed conflict, subject to lex specialis considerations 
pertaining to the parties to the conflict. 
 
VI. U.S. STATE PRACTICE 
 
U.S. State practice, as reflected in domestic court opinions interpreting in-
ternational law, U.S. law, federal regulations, and relevant military manuals 
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support the position that the obligation to render assistance to persons in 
distress at sea remains in effect during an armed conflict. 
 
A. Domestic Court Opinions 
 
Since the earliest days of the republic, U.S. courts have taken the position 
that not all treaties terminate ipso facto at the outbreak of an armed conflict. 
For example, in 1823, the U.S. Supreme Court held: 
 
[W]e are not inclined to admit the doctrine urged at the bar that treaties 
become extinguished ipso facto by war between the two governments unless 
they should be revived by an express or implied renewal on the return of 
peace. . . . There may be treaties of such a nature as to their object and 
import as that war will put an end to them, but where treaties contemplate 
a permanent arrangement of territorial and other national rights, or which 
in their terms are meant to provide for the event of an intervening war, it 
would be against every principle of just interpretation to hold them extin-
guished by the event of war. . . . We think therefore that treaties stipulating 
for permanent rights and general arrangements and professing to aim at 
perpetuity and to deal with the case of war as well as of peace do not cease 
on the occurrence of war, but are, at most, only suspended while it lasts, 
and unless they are waived by the parties or new and repugnant stipulations 
are made, they revive in their operation at the return of peace.85 
 
While recognizing that there are divergent views on the effect of war upon 
treaties, the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Karnuth v. United 
States (1929). In that case, the Court held: 
 
The effect of war upon treaties is a subject in respect of which there are 
widely divergent opinions. The doctrine sometimes asserted, especially by 
the older writers, that war ipso facto annuls treaties of every kind between 
the warring nations, is repudiated by the great weight of modern authority, 
and the view now commonly accepted is that whether the stipulations of a 
treaty are annulled by war depends upon their intrinsic character. But as to 
precisely what treaties fall and what survive under this designation, there is 
lack of accord.86 
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Further, in 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles articu-
lated in the aforementioned cases in Clark v. Allen, stating: 
 
We start from the premise that the outbreak of war does not necessarily 
suspend or abrogate treaty provisions. There may, of course, be such an 
incompatibility between a particular treaty provision and the maintenance 
of a state of war as to make clear that it should not be enforced. Or the 
Chief Executive or the Congress may have formulated a national policy 
quite inconsistent with the enforcement of a treaty in whole or in part. This 
was the view stated in Techt v. Hughes . . . .87 
 
These decisions reflect the contemporary international law view, stated 
in both the GCII Commentary and the draft ILC articles, that treaties are not 
extinguished ipso facto as a result of armed conflict. Treaties may terminate or 
be suspended if their execution is incompatible with armed conflict, such as 
treaties of a political nature. However, treaties that can reasonably be exe-
cuted after the outbreak of hostilities remain in effect and must be observed. 
The treaties reflecting the duty to render assistance fall into the latter cate-
gory. 
 
B. U.S. Laws and Regulations 
 
U.S. laws and regulations impose an obligation on masters and captains to 
render assistance to persons in distress at sea in times of peace and war. 
Consistent with Article 10 of the 1989 Salvage Convention, which calls on 
States parties to adopt measures necessary to enforce the duty to render as-
sistance to persons in distress at sea, 46 U.S.C. § 2304 imposes a statutory 
obligation on ships’ masters and individuals in charge of vessels to “render 
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assistance to any individual found at sea in danger of being lost, so far as the 
master or individual in charge can do so without serious danger to . . . [their] 
vessel or individuals on board.”88 Failure to comply with this obligation sub-
jects a master or individual violating the law to a fine not exceeding $1,000, 
two years imprisonment, or both.89 Further, Australian law imposes a similar 
obligation on non-sovereign immune vessels, even with regard to persons of 
a foreign State at war with Australia.90 
The 46 U.S.C. § 2304 obligation specifically does not apply to warships 
or other government owned or operated vessels in public service.91 However, 
the U.S. Navy imposes a similar duty on commanding officers of warships 
or the senior officer present via Article 0925 of the U.S. Navy Regulations.92 
Navy Regulations are lawful general orders under Article 92 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice.93 Failure to comply with the obligation to render 
assistance, unless doing so would seriously endanger the ship or its crew, is 
therefore subject to criminal prosecution at a special or general courts-mar-
ital.94 The case of the USS Dubuque, discussed below, exemplifies the im-
portance the U.S. Navy places on this duty. 
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U.S. Coast Guard Regulations similarly impose a comparable, but more 
expansive duty on commanding officers of Coast Guard ships. The Coast 
Guard Regulations state: “Upon receiving information that a vessel or air-
craft is in distress within the area of operation of the unit, the commanding 
officer shall, whenever it is appropriate to do so, assist such vessel or aircraft 
as soon as possible.”95 Further, the regulations provide that “[i]n rendering 
assistance during any distress case, the commanding officer shall aid the dis-
tressed vessel or aircraft and its passengers and crew until such time as it is 
able to proceed safely, or until such time as further Coast Guard assistance 
is no longer required.”96 Moreover, consistent with GCII Article 18(1), Coast 
Guard Regulations do not require, but allow for searches for bodies, albeit 
under certain circumstances: 
 
When it has been definitely established . . . that persons are dead, the Coast 
Guard is not required to conduct searches for bodies. If, however, requests 
are received from responsible agencies . . . Coast Guard units may partici-
pate in body searches provided that these searches do not interfere with 
the primary duties of the units. Commanding officers and officers in charge 
shall exercise tact and good judgment in the use of their forces for such 
purposes.97 
 
In the event of a reported distress, the commanding officer of a Coast 
Guard vessel under way shall, unless otherwise directed by higher authority, 
“proceed immediately toward the scene of any reported distress within the 
range of operation.”98 Similarly, the commanding officer of a ship in port 
shall, unless otherwise directed by higher authority, “proceed, as soon as 
possible, to the scene of any reported distress within that area of opera-
tion.”99 When rendering aid and assistance, “the commanding officer shall 
use sound discretion and shall not unnecessarily jeopardize the vessel or the 
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lives of the personnel assigned to it.”100 Additionally, having due regard for 
the health of his or her crew, “the commanding officer shall take on board 
distressed seamen of the United States, shipwrecked persons, and persons 
requiring medical care.”101 Once on board, “assisted persons shall be fur-
nished rations and may be transported to the nearest or most convenient 
port of the United States.”102 
The duty to render assistance, however, only applies to “vessels or air-
craft [and seamen or airmen] of a foreign State at peace with the United 
States.”103 Accordingly, if the United States is a neutral during the conflict, 
Coast Guard ships could provide assistance to any of the belligerents at 
peace with the United States, as well as to other neutral nations. Assistance 
to a vessel and its crew of a nation at war with the United States would not 
be provided under the Coast Guard Regulations, but rather would be af-
forded under Article 18 of GCII. Coast Guard Regulations also allow the 
commanding officer to provide assistance to private efforts, when neces-
sary.104 This would include efforts by relief societies or private entities en-
gaged in the collection of wounded, sick, or shipwrecked personnel. 
The duty to assist persons, ships, and aircraft in distress at sea is also 
reflected in U.S. military manuals. For example, The Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law of Naval Operations reflects the view of the maritime services—
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—that “customary international law 
has long recognized the affirmative obligation of mariners to go to the assis-
tance of those in danger of being lost at sea” as codified in both the 1958 
High Seas Convention and UNCLOS.105 A similar view on the customary 
nature of the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea is ex-
pressed in the German Navy Commander’s Handbook—“It is not due to 
the morale of mariners but in accordance with seafaring tradition and thus 
with customary law that all mariners help each other in cases of distress at 
sea.”106 Thus, as a customary rule, the duty to render assistance remains in 
effect in times of peace, as well as war. 
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C. USS Dubuque Incident 
 
For its part, the United States takes the duty to render assistance seriously. 
As an example, on June 10, 1988, the USS Dubuque (LPD 8) came across a 
boatload of eighty Vietnamese refugees adrift in a dilapidated junk in the 
South China Sea.107 The U.S. warship, under the command of Captain Alex-
ander Balian, was en route to the Persian Gulf to assume minesweeping du-
ties after the USS Roberts (FFG 58) struck an Iranian M-08 mine in the central 
Persian Gulf on April 14, 1988. The Dubuque was carrying a contingent of 
nine hundred Marines to augment U.S. forces in the Gulf in the event of 
further hostilities with Iran following Operation Praying Mantis. Standing 
orders in effect at the time of the incident included: (1)  U .S. Navy Regula-
tions, Article 0925, which required commanding officers to render assistance 
to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; and (2) Commander, U.S. 
Seventh Fleet Operations Order 201, which required commanding officers 
to take on board persons in life endangering circumstances at sea if relief of 
persons in such circumstances cannot be accomplished by repair to boats, 
re-provisioning, or navigational assistance. 
An inspection of the junk by the Dubuque’s executive officer revealed 
that the vessel had a makeshift sail and appeared seaworthy, but did not have 
an operable engine. In his report to Captain Balian, he also reported that 
twenty people had already died on the voyage and that the remaining survi-
vors on board looked emaciated and distraught. Nonetheless, Captain Balian 
elected not to embark the refugees on the ship because he believed it would 
endanger his mission by delaying considerably the Dubuque’s arrival in the 
Persian Gulf. He was also concerned about the health and safety of his crew. 
Captain Balian decided to provide the refugees with provisions—fruit, 
canned food, rice, and fresh water—and send them on their way with a nav-
igational chart containing plotted coordinates to the Philippines. However, 
Captain Balian was unaware that the junk had been adrift for nineteen days, 
not seven as he had been told, and that thirty of the original 110 passengers 
on board had already died. Balian was also misinformed that there were only 
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sixty (rather than eighty) refugees on board the junk. As a result, he miscal-
culated the time it would take for the boat to reach the Philippines and the 
amount of provisions needed; therefore, the food and water provided was 
insufficient for the remainder of the journey. The refugees drifted for nine-
teen more days until rescued by a Filipino fishing vessel. Only fifty-two of 
the original 110 refugees that left Vietnam survived the ordeal. When they 
ran out of food, they resorted to cannibalism to survive. 
As a result of his failure to take the refugees on board or provide other 
means for their rescue, Captain Balian received a general court-martial at 
which he was found guilty of dereliction of duty for failing to give adequate 
assistance to the refugees. He received a career-ending letter of reprimand, 




Although the law regarding the effects of armed conflict on preexisting treaty 
obligations is not completely settled, most contemporary scholars would 
agree with the position taken by the ICRC in the GCII Commentary that the 
initiation of hostilities does not ipso facto terminate or suspend application of 
previous adopted international agreements.108 Most scholars would also 
agree that the concept of lex specialis derogat legi generali (special law repeals 
general laws) constitutes a general principle of international law.109 The con-
cept is frequently raised when debating the applicability of international hu-
man rights law during armed conflicts regulated by IHL, but it can also apply 
to other bodies of law, such as the law of the sea. 
The United States takes the position that in nearly all circumstances, IHL 
is the lex specialis governing armed conflict and the protection of armed con-
flict victims.110 This position is based on the premise that “[t]he rule that is 
more specifically directed towards the action receives priority because it 
takes better account of the particular features of the context in which the law 
is to be applied, thus creating a more equitable result and better reflecting 
the intent of the authorities that have made the law.”111 In this regard, IHL 
“has been developed with special consideration of the circumstances of war 
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and the challenges inherent in its regulation by law.”112 Accordingly, IHL 
treaties like GCII are viewed as “lex specialis in relation to treaties providing 
peacetime norms concerning the same subjects.”113 Thus, as between oppos-
ing belligerents, the obligation to search for and collect the shipwrecked, 
wounded, and sick reflected in Article 18 of GCII would be viewed as lex 
specialis in relation to the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at 
sea contained in the various peacetime maritime treaties. The U.S. Coast 
Guard Regulations, which limit the duty to render assistance to “vessels or 
aircraft [and their crews] of a foreign state at peace with the United States,” 
confirm this conclusion.114 
The GCII Commentary suggests that it could “be argued that the more a 
question is linked, or the closer it occurs to, actual hostilities” the more GCII 
prevails.115 Thus, the ICRC argues that “situations far from the battlefield or 
not linked to actual hostilities may still be regulated by” the maritime trea-
ties.116 While this position may have some humanitarian appeal, it is not sup-
ported in law or by State practice. For the purpose of searching for and col-
lecting casualties at sea after an engagement, IHL is lex specialis vis-à-vis the 
belligerents regardless of the proximity to the battlefield. 
That is not to say, however, that the duty to render assistance reflected 
in the various maritime treaties is abrogated during an armed conflict vis-à-
vis the belligerents and neutrals or between neutrals and other States not 
party to the conflict. Consistent with the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda 
(agreements must be kept)117 the obligation would remain in force between 
neutrals. Similarly, the obligation would remain in force between neutrals 
and the parties to the conflict as a customary rule of international law. Most 
governments and contemporary scholars agree that the duty to render assis-
tance to persons in distress at sea is widely recognized as a long-standing 
principle of international law.118 The existence of an armed conflict does not 
override the duty of a State to fulfill its obligations “embodied in the treaty 
to which it would be subject under international law independently of that 
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treaty.”119 Parties to the conflict and neutral powers are therefore bound dur-
ing an armed conflict at sea by the provisions of the maritime conventions 
that reflect customary international law. 
In sum, the peacetime duty to render assistance to mariners in distress at 
sea remains in effect during an armed conflict as a treaty obligation and/or 
as a matter of customary international law in the following circumstances: 
(1) Neutrals parties must render assistance to other neutral parties; (2) Neu-
trals parties must render assistance to belligerents upon request or sua sponte; 
and (3) Belligerent parties must render assistance to neutral parties. How-
ever, the obligation is suspended as between the belligerents during the 
armed conflict. 
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